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Abstract
This text addresses a specific religious and ethical tradition, namely the protestant 
version of Christianity, and a specific field of what is currently referred to as ‘applied 
ethics,’ specifically economic ethics, in order to find out in which way this tradition 
and this field of applied ethics are interwoven and it does so in a situation in which 
both parts of this pair seem to be in trouble.
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1. Economic ethics
As far as economic ethics is concerned the triumphal march of a capitalistic 
market economy after the breakdown of state capitalism in the former 
communist regimes since the late 1980s remains in sharp contrast to the 
lack of inner legitimacy of this economic system. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that across the globe there seems to be a resurgence of the call for 
‘socialism’ which is vaguely understood as an alternative economic order. 
Among the various reasons for the loss of inner legitimacy the following 
are in my view of significant importance: The one-sided emphasis on 
shareholder value that already culminated in the 1990s; the growing 
independence of the investment section of the financial markets that, 
during the 2008/2009 crisis, demonstrated their capacity regionally as 
well as globally, to endanger economic stability; and finally, the experience 
that vulnerable groups do not profit but feel excluded from the benefits of 
economic growth. In addition, the most dramatic challenges of our time – 
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global climate change and the global refugee crisis – are without a doubt, at 
least in part, caused by economic developments.
The lack of legitimacy of the globally dominating variants of the capitalist 
market economy goes hand in hand with a lack of ethical clarity and 
moral consensus. In the process of globalization, the plurality of religious, 
cultural and ethical options has become indisputably obvious. Whether 
ethical worldviews would eventually achieve overarching moral consensus 
remains completely unclear. Some, neglected by others, debate the issue 
of whether or not religious beliefs still have a contribution to make. On 
the one hand, there is the worldwide growth of religious communities and 
the emergence of new kinds of religious groups, especially of indigenous, 
Pentecostal, charismatic and evangelical variants of Christianity. On the 
other hand, there is widespread denial of any relevance of religion for the 
‘life questions’ of our time. The negligence – even denial – of the contribution 
religions could make, is strengthened by the continuing assumption that at 
least Europe and – astonishingly enough – North-America (jointly called 
‘the West’) went through a process of secularization that can by no means 
be reversed. Let me illustrate this with reference to an example regarding 
the ‘West’ and the role of Christianity.
The American historian Brad S. Gregory, in his book The Unintended 
Reformation. How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (2012) is one 
of many authors who presents the ‘Middle Ages’ as a time in which the 
religious fabric of society was consistent and homogeneous, and in which 
religion was clearly predominant as the guarantor of social cohesion. 
Authors like him often add that the Reformation, in contrast, brought 
with it a fragmentation of the fabric of society as became manifest in 
the confessional wars of early modernity. That finally made it necessary 
to construct the peace of nations on the basis of the adage ‘etsi deus non 
daretur – as if there were no God,’ to quote Hugo Grotius, a preeminent 
legal scholar of the 17th century. Very generally reviewed, this turn is linked 
to the idea of an inevitable secularization of society, which means that at 
least since the enlightenment religion no longer plays any crucial role in 
weaving the social fabric.
This construction is problematic in all its three steps, namely the 
homogeneous Middle Ages, the dividing Reformation and the secularizing 
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modernity. The perceived homogeneity of the Middle Ages has more to do 
with a Romantic construction than with the realities of those centuries, 
as they were already characterized by remarkable regional differences 
which led to manifold ‘Micro-Christendom’s’ (Brown 2013: 355–380). They 
include movements of renewal and reform without which the Reformation 
of the 16th century is not understandable at all. This process itself included 
not only fragmentation, but also a lively interaction of the different forms 
seeking to understand the Christian faith, including the Catholic reform 
that already began during the 16th century (Kaufmann 2017). Not only 
this narrative of fragmentation, but also the narrative of secularization, 
has become highly debated, so that nowadays only a minority of the 
sociologists of religion favours them. For an alternative view, Hans Joas 
turns our attention to the plurality of options with regard to worldview 
and belief, combined with an ongoing interplay between sacralisation and 
desacralisation (Joas 2014). That the thesis of secularization is insufficient 
becomes even more evident when the issue is approached not only with the 
‘West’ in mind, but also from a global perspective. From this perspective, 
religion, for better or for worse, is among those forces that contribute to the 
strengthening or the dissolution of the social fabric (Martin 2011).
Therefore, the question of the interplay between concrete formations of 
Christian ethics and applied ethics is not an outdated question. However, 
the unpacking and answering of this question has to bear historical 
developments and models in mind. Economic ethics in this regard provides 
a good example. Whenever it comes to the task of explaining the genesis 
of the modern capitalistic form of economy, its relation to a specific form 
of Christian belief and behaviour is on the agenda: The interaction of 
‘Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism’ comes into play.
2. The Weber Thesis
The problem mentioned above, is associated with a name: we are directly 
reminded of Max Weber, one of the key figures of the emerging sociology, 
including the sociology of religion, at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. 
His contribution to the topic is well-known right up to today, and has even 
been recognized at the German carnival in its stronghold in Cologne. One 
of the leading bands of this carnival put together a song some years ago, that 
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begins with the following lines1: “Max Weber once said, that only labour 
is important,/that God gives grace to those, who don’t forget their duties./
Idleness and carnival are a waste of time./The one who earns a lot on earth, 
gets the best seat near to God.” And the refrain starts with the words: “I 
am so happy that I’m not a Protestant,/they have nothing in mind but to 
work …” (Radkau 2014: 239) So, in the carnival version we already find 
reference to the two elements of work ethic and of capital accumulation 
as characteristic of protestant economic ethics. In addition, Max Weber is 
held responsible for us knowing about it, not only by the carnival clowns 
of Cologne, but also by many intellectuals, economists, and politicians 
around the globe.
Let me illustrate that by means of a very different example. A decade ago, I 
visited the Chinese Office for Religious Affairs, eager to learn more about 
the official concept of the Chinese political approach to religion. Very 
rapidly, I was given the answer that the ideal combination of basic elements 
understood to be necessary for the fabric of the gigantic Chinese empire 
were Marxism, Capitalism, Protestantism and Confucianism. Marxism 
was named as justification of a one-party-system, Capitalism as engine for 
economic growth, Protestantism as the legitimation of capital accumulation 
and commitment, Confucianism as basis for obedience and a sense of duty 
and order. The South-Korean-American President of the World Bank, Jim 
Yong Kim, also mentioned the specific connection between Protestantism 
and Confucianism in an interview in 2014, in which he emphasized the 
so-called Weber thesis. He added that not only Protestantism, but also 
Confucianism could initiate economic dynamics, as the example of South 
Korea demonstrates (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 17, 2014). It 
appears that in intellectual circles in East Asia Protestantism is more often 
identified with the name of Max Weber than with the names of Martin 
Luther or John Calvin.
1 Max Weber hat gesagt, dass nur die Arbeit wichtig ist, dass der Herrgott den begnadigt, 
der die Pflichten nicht vergisst. Müssiggang und Karneval, das ist für die Katz, wer 
auf Erden viel verdient, hat bei Gott den besten Platz. Ich bin so froh, dass ich nicht 
evangelisch bin, die haben doch nichts anderes als arbeiten im Sinn. Als Katholik da 
kannste pfuschen, dat eine is jewiss, am Samstag gehste beichten und fott is der janze 
Driss. (http://www.gutefrage.net/frage/songtext-gesucht-comedy)
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This kind of typological understanding of the Protestant ethos is not 
restricted to the fields of economics or politics. In certain psychological 
research, ‘protestant ethics’ is seen as a ‘personality variable’ characterized 
by sexual guilt and moral conscience guilt, by authoritarianism, expectancy 
of internal control, and finally by a concrete, pragmatic approach to work 
which is negatively correlated with occupations that typically require 
emotional sensitivity, theoretical interests, and humanistic values (Mirels/
Garrett 1971). As a result, we can call the so-called Weber Thesis an ideal 
type of protestant ethic, bearing in mind, that ideal types in Weber’s sense 
are not at all ideal. Although the authors reporting on this psychological 
research acknowledged that ‘the validity of Weber’s thesis concerning 
the causal relationship between Protestantism and Capitalism has been 
energetically debated’ it did not withhold them from stating that ‘the 
impact of the ascetic orientation (i.e. of Protestantism) on contemporary 
Western social institutions has been widely attested.’ (Mirels/Garrett 1971, 
40)
Regardless of the fact that the Weber Thesis has been criticized as to its 
historic validity for a long time, it was rejuvenated after World War II in 
order to explain the strength of the US-American model of managing their 
economy successfully. The unity between a committed Christian lifestyle 
and success in business was seen as a marker of the uniqueness of the 
American way as such. Weber’s idea of worldly asceticism was transformed 
into one of high esteem for benefactors of different kinds, for philanthropic 
foundations, for cultural sponsorship, etc. Some years ago, Niall Ferguson 
even used this concept to explain the success of the US-economy compared 
to a perceived decline in the middle and north-western European economies 
in the early years of the 21th century. He interpreted this as a decline of 
Protestantism in Europe, signalled also by a degradation of work ethic for 
which he took working hours per year and working years per lifetime as 
criteria. Evidently, his conviction was that the longer working hours of 
American workers had nothing to do with weak labour unions; rather, it 
indicated the strength of Protestantism in the Weberian sense (Ferguson 
2003). Ten years later Ferguson included the United States of America in 
his gloomy prediction as well, and did not hesitate to compare his analysis 
in ‘The West and the Rest’ to Oswald Spengler’s ‘The Decline of the West’ 
(‘Der Untergang des Abendlandes,’ 1st ed., vol.1, 1918). Whereas Spengler 
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had discerned a cultural decline in the West, Fergusson argues in terms of 
economical characteristics. Among the success factors of the West – now 
including America – he emphasizes technological innovation, medical 
progress, and the likes, but also pertinently work ethic and consumerism 
as two central elements of economic growth. These are factors that he finds 
to be more and more neglected. He therefore expects that the West will 
sooner or later economically be overruled by East Asia, especially China 
(Ferguson 2011). Ferguson foresees a point in time when China will replace 
the US as the biggest national economy in terms of the BIP. Four years 
ago, Ferguson expected that to happen in exactly 2017 (Ferguson 2013). 
Other analysts have, however, expressed doubt that this is likely to happen 
in the near future. Different from his earlier interpretations Ferguson now 
relativizes his former high esteem of the ‘God factor,’ but as far as the role 
of the work ethic is concerned he still, at least implicitly, uses a Weberian 
concept.
Nowadays the Weber Thesis is even applied with a completely contrary 
intention. This inversion of the thesis has been induced by developments 
in contemporary finance dominated capitalism with destructive 
consequences for workers and debtors dependent on it. Kathryn Tanner 
devoted her Gifford Lectures of 2016 to the topic ‘Christianity and the 
New Spirit of Capitalism.’ Her title already indicated that she intends to 
challenge Weber with his own arguments. She proposes that the pervasive 
force of finance dominated capitalism “might be countered by Christian 
beliefs and practices with a comparable capacity to shape people. Thus, 
these lectures reverse the project of … Max Weber …, while employing 
much the same methods as he used. Weber showed how Christian beliefs 
and practices could form persons in line with what capitalism required of 
them.” Tanner´ s “lectures will demonstrate the capacity of Christian beliefs 
and practices to help people resist the dictates of capitalism in its present, 
finance dominated configuration” (Tanner 2016b, cf. Tanner 2016a). 
‘Weber’s method’ indicates that Tanner also finds a causal relationship 
between religious conviction and the structuring of the economy. The 
‘formation of persons’ is seen as the key to the transformation of the 
economy. Whereas according to the Weber Thesis the image of the puritan 
personality and her worldly asceticism furthered the spreading of the 
capitalist spirit, Tanner’s concept counters the cultural forms of finance-
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dominated capitalism. For her, Christian beliefs and practices have the 
capacity to help people “to resist the dictates of capitalism in its present, 
finance dominated configuration.” To scrutinize and appraise Tanner’s 
argument will, however, only be possible when her lectures appear in print.
An approach comparable to Kathryn Tanner’s project was presented in 
a campaign under the title ‘Radicalizing Reformation’ (Duchrow et al. 
2015). The authors summarize their concept in 94 theses that start with: 
“At least two billion people are impoverished by the domination of money. 
That is the contemporary expression of Mammon and therefore the central 
challenge for faith” (Duchrow et al. 2015: 5, 24). The consequence is “to 
drop out on a daily basis personally and socially from the destructive 
domination of money and to live – confident in the liberating justice of God 
– in compassion and solidarity in just relationships with other humans and 
creatures” (Duchrow et al. 2015: 1,28). Rather than articulating maxims 
for action by those with economic responsibility, or global regulations 
with regard to a globalized economy, the right strategy is regarded as 
one in which individuals and groups withdraw from the present state of 
affairs. This kind of withdrawal from the ruling system requires a personal 
dedication. As historical examples show, from time to time this may be an 
important pioneering approach, but it cannot be generalized as a moral 
standard for economically responsible subjects or for the regulation of the 
economy by legal rules. Therefore it is highly questionable whether the 
challenges related to a globalized and finance-dominated economy can be 
met by the instrument of personal or group withdrawal. There are obvious 
limits to an inverse use of the Weber Thesis.
As far as the causal interpretation of this thesis is concerned, Weber himself 
was, at least in a part of his formulations, quite careful, even to the point 
of risking compromising clarity. For instance, he described the relation 
between ascetic Protestantism and capitalism as an “elective affinity” 
(Wahlverwandtschaft) – an expression that allows for a certain vagueness 
on who elected whom and in which way. However, it cannot be my task to 
describe and critically analyse Weber’s famous essays, of which the first 
was published in 1904/05, with later additions and revisions (see the rich 
material in Weber 2014; 2016). Instead, I will concentrate on one aspect of 
its implicit theology.
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Weber takes up a lay-theological interpretation of the teaching of John 
Calvin, the central figure of the second-generation Reformers of the 
16th century. He does so because he is convinced that this lay theology 
highly influenced Puritan Christians in early modernity, especially in 
North-Western Europa and then in North-America. According to this 
interpretation, the election of the individual Christian for eternal salvation 
can immediately be recognized in her relationship to temporal, mundane 
realities. Already in the second part of his studies on Protestantism, in the 
essay on ‘Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,’ Weber emphasized 
the question of the “salvation premium” (‘Heilsprämie’) as the central 
point of his research. In the later revision of his text, he formally regretted 
that his critics had not considered this point. Literally he said: “Not the 
ethical doctrine of a religion, but that form of ethical conduct upon which 
premiums are placed, matters” (Seligman 1998: XXXII). In the case of 
Calvinism the salvation premium, or bonus, in Weber’s understanding has 
a specific form that is related to the doctrine of double predestination, to 
salvation or damnation. No-one can live in absolute uncertainty in view 
of this double predestination. Therefore, people need at least “symptoms” 
of their election. In addition, the positive results of worldly asceticism in 
terms of economic success are such “symptoms” that give the certainty of 
belonging to a ‘salvation aristocracy.’
That is, of course, a very brief summary of Weber´ s concept of salvation 
bonuses. But more important than a detailed description and interpretation 
of his text, is that Weber was unsuccessful in presenting historical evidence 
for the assumption that his kind of lay theology indeed shaped the culture 
in puritan communities to such an extent that the influence of this ethic 
on the emerging capitalism is plausible. There are also insufficient reasons 
for the assumption that the doctrine of double predestination created 
a kind of uncertainty that had to be and was indeed balanced by the 
concept of a salvation bonus for worldly asceticism. At least, this bonus 
was not consistently acknowledged. There was no guarantee for successful 
bankers in the Netherlands that they would not be excluded from the 
Eucharist as sinners – an idea that had caused some amusement in catholic 
Italy (Reinhard 2005: 283). Also, there was insufficient support for the 
assumption that the puritan capitalists became acquisitive virtuosi, because 
simultaneously they were religious virtuosi who aspired to be members 
of a salvation aristocracy. The assumption regarding the combination of 
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financial bonuses and salvation bonuses was not based on solid ground. 
Finally, recent research finds no plausibility in the idea that this kind of 
worldly asceticism can explain “the shift of the focus of mercantile activity 
and entrepreneurial innovation from the Mediterranean to the north-west 
of the European continent” in the post-Reformation era. The history of 
European wars, the emergence of the Ottoman Turks, or the marginalized 
social position of dissenters who sought recognition, are examples of 
alternative explanations (Walsham 2015: 241f.).
Ernst Troeltsch, a close colleague and friend of Max Weber already stated 
in Weber’s own time that it was then commonly understood that the big 
economic and social transformations of the 16th century had happened 
independently of the religious movements of the time. These movements 
reacted to the transformations more or less reluctantly, and adapted to 
the new situation at differing tempos. Interestingly enough, in this regard 
Troeltsch saw the Catholic Church as more flexible than the Lutheran 
church (Troeltsch 1992: II, 869f.).
What in any case cannot be denied is that over time the link between 
financial success and election certainty lost all plausibility. Weber had 
anticipated that to a certain extent. He assumed that established capitalism 
reduces the spirit to the form. Later capitalism no longer needs a cultural 
basis as it did during early capitalism. However, there is yet another reason: 
The double predestination theory lost its credibility even for Calvinists or 
Presbyterians. Around the world, wherever you meet them, you will not 
easily come across any who are passionate about this doctrine. This is even 
more so in the broader stream of Protestantism in its different variants. As 
problematic as the historic argument is, the general assumption that the 
spirit which Protestantism contributed to the development of capitalism 
was the spirit of the ‘salvation bonus.’ That takes us a step further in our 
theological analysis.
3. The concept of vocation
There are good reasons for the assumption that the ‘Protestant work 
ethic’ rather than acquisitive capitalism underpins Reformation theology, 
because the Reformation developed her own clear concept on the value of 
human labour. This concept was very closely linked to a central theological 
interpretation of the standing of the human person before God. The concept 
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of justification by God’s grace alone, already formulated by St. Paul in the 
New Testament and rediscovered by Martin Luther, had answered the 
question of the status of people before God. This conception is completely 
incompatible with the idea of a ‘salvation bonus.’
A central question within this concept of valuing human labour refers 
to the place of human action with regard to grace. The Reformers 
argue consistently that the quality of human deeds cannot be seen as a 
precondition for access to divine grace. This is because, measured against 
the criterion of God’s will, no person will overcome her sinfulness by her 
own deeds; on the contrary, such an assumption will lead her even deeper 
into sinful self-centeredness. Worldly activities are not means of making 
God gracious towards humans; rather, they follow the gift of divine grace. 
Understanding Christian freedom as the liberation from self-centred, 
anxious worry about one’s own salvation opens the way to a relational 
concept of the human person: One is related to God in faith, to one’s 
neighbour as to oneself in love. The human person is constituted by faith; 
her deeds are measured by love.
To illustrate this understanding of the interaction between faith and deeds 
Luther uses the image of the tree and its fruits. It is not the fruit that makes 
a tree good. Instead, the good tree makes good fruits possible. The fruits 
follow the tree as the good works (Luther does not hesitate to use the term) 
follow faith. In this sense and in this sequence, together they constitute the 
whole of Christian life as a life in freedom.
In Luther’s understanding, all worldly activity follows a divine calling and 
is in this sense a vocation. For this concept Luther prefers the word Beruf 
over against Ruf or Berufung; Beruf in his understanding can be translated 
by ‘vocation’ or ‘calling’ as well as by ‘profession’. This use of the word 
has predecessors in the Middle Ages and is already reflected in Luther’s 
translation of the New Testament of 1522. He develops this understanding 
further in the course of criticizing monastic vows (1522), and develops it 
in his sermons from 1522 onwards (Stegmann 2014: 360–390). He finds the 
idea of a special kind of status in Christianity that is distinguished from 
all other statuses by an inner vocation, unacceptable, because the divine 
justification addresses every person similarly – as a child of God, gifted 
with God’s justifying grace. From there the equal status of every person in 
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relation to God and to the world emerges. Every person therefore has an 
internal as well as an external vocation.
The inner vocation calls for unity of faith in God and of love to the 
neighbour as to oneself; the outer vocation expresses itself in a concrete 
mandate to a worldly activity in one of the major fields – in the language 
of the time – that is polity, economy (including family), and church. There 
is no longer any hierarchy regarding these fields. Whether a person works 
in politics, in the economy and family, or in the church does not matter. 
His or her profession has equal dignity to others and has to be respected in 
its usefulness for other individuals, for the greater community and for the 
common good.
It is interesting to realize how the foundation of human life on justification 
by grace alone is seen as constitutive of a fundamental equality of the 
different tasks of persons in their daily responsibilities. Whether they are 
simple support tasks in agriculture or family, the financial responsibility 
of a merchant or a banker, the political responsibility of a prince or the 
spiritual responsibility of a pastor in his congregation – in all these cases 
we see persons who are following their vocation. The concept includes paid 
work as well as voluntary work, the unpaid work of a mother as well as the 
paid work of a servant.
Work as vocation: that is the specific approach of the Reformation 
to economic ethics. This approach includes the responsibility of the 
entrepreneur as well as of the labourer; it includes the employee as well 
as the employer. On the basis of this understanding of ‘Beruf ’, the core of 
what is called the Protestant work ethos may be defined as follows: Human 
labour is the use of one’s talents and opportunities in order to fulfil useful 
and honest tasks and to do it productively not only to one’s own benefit, 
but also to the benefit of others and the community. To make use of one’s 
talents and opportunities, one needs appropriate education and formation. 
Therefore, it was not at all accidental that the Reformation turned out to be, 
at its centre, an educational movement.
Without a doubt, Luther’s concept of work as vocation emphasizes the 
commandment to stay in the status into which a person is called. Compared 
to the rather static character of Luther’s concept, Calvin seems to represent 
a more dynamic approach.
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His ethics can generally be understood as an ‘Ethics of Gratitude.’ Taking 
this approach, the Heidelberg Catechism, one of the central confessional 
documents of the early Reformed churches, summarized the intention of 
Calvin very well in the section on Christian life under the heading ‘On 
gratitude.’ Calvin himself emphasizes enjoying and using the divine gifts 
of creation as features of Christian life, and to use them. Because these gifts 
carry the danger of misuse – either by excess or by exaggerated frugality 
– using them prudently and measuredly is decisive. This approach follows 
from Christian freedom that, in Calvin’s understanding, comprises three 
elements: Freedom from judgment by the divine law, the possibility 
of consciously loving God and fellow humans as yourself, and finally, 
independently dealing with the so-called ‘adiaphora,’ those questions for 
which no clear advice or commandment exists (Institutio III, 19). Issues 
related to ecclesial ceremonies, lifestyle or eating habits, but also questions 
of prudence in economic affairs belong to this ‘middle ground,’ i.e. they 
have to be dealt with consciously and decidedly, while taking into account 
the perspective of Christian responsibility.
In his understanding of work and profession, Calvin took the dynamics of 
economic development more seriously than Luther did (McGrath 1999). 
However, the idea, that success in profession and its monetary result 
are able to guarantee certain salvation, occurs neither in Calvin’s nor in 
Luther’s work. That is not astonishing, because for Calvin the bold theory 
of a double predestination – for salvation or damnation – means first, 
that God’s transcendence has to be respected and his grace shall not be 
misunderstood as ‘cheap grace.’ (Bonhoeffer 1989: 29) In Calvin’s view, 
the intention to gain salvation would even be annulled by the expectation 
of finding certainty on one’s salvation from the successes of one’s own 
working life. For a Christian the certainty of salvation lies for a Christian 
on the side of Christ and not on the side of the merit or the success of his/
her own deeds. At its heart Calvin’s understanding of work as calling, is 
consistent with Luther’s insight into the relevance of justification by grace 
alone for the understanding of human deeds.
Particularly notable is that the high premium placed on work has 
consequences for dealing with poverty. The Reformers criticize any spiritual 
elevation of poverty, and state in opposition to the mendicant orders 
the duty of everyone to take care of his/her own basic needs. Regarding 
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the spiritual status there is no exception to the preference of work over 
living off alms. However, at the same time they distinguish “between the 
deserving and undeserving poor, between those able but unwilling to work 
and those incapacitated by illness or other circumstances beyond their 
control” (Walsham 2015: 242). They emphasize the responsibility of the 
political body to care for those who are unable to find their own livelihood. 
This is the starting point for a political concept of social welfare. Neither 
orders nor brotherhoods, but municipalities have to care for the poor and 
the needy within their walls. However, they are not obliged to give access 
to beggars coming in from the outside, mendicants included. Care for 
the poor became organized in the form of publicly administered funds 
(‘Gemeiner Kasten’), prompted especially by the secularization of church 
treasuries. This consequence of the protestant work ethic regarding care for 
poor people followed remarkably quickly in many places.
4. The distinction between interest and usury as touchstone
Also of specific interest regarding the consequences of the high valuation 
of work for dealing with poverty, is how a ‘preferential option for the poor’ 
presents as a very important criterion for the reformers in dealing with a 
question of economic ethics that was of outstanding importance to them, 
namely the distinction between interest and usury in money lending 
(Nelson 1969).
This distinction was unheard of in the preceding period of theological 
thinking. In the preceding period the Biblical commandment that forbid 
taking interest – at least in dealing with your own people, your own 
community (Dt.23:19–20), was taken literally. The reformers had to deal 
with the transition from a home economy to a monetary economy. Of 
course, this transformation caused a lot of worry and distrust. Luther also 
had his misgivings regarding certain practices that emerged in the money 
economy. Usury became one of the core issues he dealt with during his 
whole career as a public writer. He argued against the tendency to raise 
extreme profits while professing love for fellow humans. As far as interest 
was concerned, he confronted creditors with the golden rule – to treat the 
other as you would be treated yourself – in asking whether the creditor 
would judge the imposed interest as fair, if he himself were in the position 
of the debtor. In remembering the Biblical commandment, he wanted to 
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open a space for critical evaluation of a form of behaviour that was already 
seen as more or less normal in his times. Luther insisted on the question 
whether interest on loans or purchases indeed served both sides best. He 
dramatically challenged the asymmetric relationship in which creditors are 
enriched within a very short period to the extent that they easily “surpass 
kings and emperors”, whereas others fall deeper and deeper into debt. 
However, he combined this sharp criticism with practical suggestions for a 
fair distribution of risk and a limitation of the interest rate.
With the distinction between interest and usury, the reformers accepted 
the functional use of interest that allowed for a temporal difference between 
buying and paying. In this respect, Calvin was more consistent than Luther 
was. He summarized his insights in a famous letter to Claude de Sachins 
in 1545 (Corpus Reformatorum 38, 1: 245–249) in which he argued for a 
hermeneutical procedure to understand the religious and ethical impulse 
of the Biblical commandment in its inner sense rather than in its literal 
proposal, and to use this inner sense as a criterion for dealing with the 
inherent logic of economic thinking (Nelson 1969: 75–82; Sauer 1997; 
Sauer 2003). Therefore, he interpreted the Biblical Commandment not as 
a general prohibition of interest as such. Instead, he drew attention to the 
objective of avoiding the detrimental effects of interest on a community. 
This danger has to do with the fact that the misfortune of the one is so 
easily turned into a benefit for the other in circumstances with an implicit 
tendency towards exploitation. As long as only the commandment not to 
take interest is stated repeatedly, the core issue is not even addressed. The 
question is actually about the rules that will prevent the exploitation of 
misfortunes or emergencies. The pragmatic usefulness of taking interest 
has to be balanced against respect for the other person who is, as every 
human being, created in the image of God, and whose destiny has therefore 
to be taken into account. This reflection brings Calvin, as other Reformers, 
to distinguish between interest and usury, in a manner that was not used 
in previous stages of this debate. The rate of interest and other conditions 
related to it, had to stay within the boundaries of equity; usury, in contrast, 
was understood as an exploitation of emergencies without respect for the 
integrity of the persons involved. To stay within given legal restrictions, to 
apply equity in conditions of economic exchange, and to respect the destiny 
of the poor are the main criteria under which the Reformers accepted 
interest as an instrument of economic exchange.
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5. Conclusion
What are possible consequences to be drawn from the brief sketch that has 
led our reflection from worldly asceticism to worldly service in the form of 
vocation, as the Reformers understood it, and to the preferential option for 
the poor, as the Reformers used it in their differentiation between interest 
and usury?
The possible consequences can be approached in either a descriptive or a 
constructive way.
As far as the descriptive way is concerned, I restrict myself only to one 
example, namely the preparatory steps that led to the model of social 
market economy developed in West Germany after World War II. Among 
those preparatory steps were remarkable contributions emerging from 
Catholic Social Teaching on the one hand, and from Social Protestantism 
on the other. Catholic Social Teaching emphasized the social character of 
the human person in arguing for social institutions that respect the person 
and promote solidarity and subsidiarity. Social Protestantism strongly 
underlined personal freedom as a central value for the understanding 
of human freedom. However, they found this personal freedom to be 
inseparable from responsibility not only for themselves, but also for other 
persons, and later even for nature and for future generations. From both 
perspectives the preference for a market economy was emphasized but on 
condition of a regulatory framework that would guarantee fair competition 
between the participants in the market, fair procedures for negotiating 
working conditions, and finally sufficient measures of social justice and 
social security (Jähnichen 2010). Therefore, it is evident that the milieus 
of Social Protestantism and Social Catholicism nurtured the emergence of 
the concept of a social market economy, as heterogeneous the conceptual 
strengths and weaknesses were that both sides contributed. As far as the 
protestant arguments are concerned, more rigorous research shows that 
their protagonists had neither a homogeneous understanding of their 
protestant religious identity, nor a convergent concept for the order of a 
market economy. On the one hand, an order by competition and on the 
other an order of competition was emphasized. A comparable ambiguity 
can be observed in respect of the relationship between the economic and 
the political order (Reuter 2010).
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This development of a social market economy commenced nearly seventy 
years ago. In the meantime, the fairness of competition was endangered by 
developments that could not be anticipated at the time. Working conditions 
became fragile and precarious due to a whole series of reasons, among 
which the development of a global labour market is of specific importance. 
The understanding of justice became challenged by the fact that it is no 
longer sufficient to look for justice in a seemingly closed society, as the 
conditions of a global society now have to be considered.
However, I argue for the position of not giving up on the potential of the 
concept of vocation, and specifically a broadened concept, in the sense of 
understanding human existence as active, creative, and productive life 
(Meireis 2008; 2010). Activity in this broad sense is a form of self-realization, 
but also a source of social recognition. The meaning of work changes but it 
does not disappear. At a time in which worldwide we observe employment 
becoming increasingly precarious and even growing unemployment, 
indifference towards the value of work is in conflict with the demands of 
justice. The protestant concept of the equal freedom of every person as 
the basis of individual responsibility as well as of social justice shows its 
relevance even under the conditions of our time.
That, of course, raises the question of what we mean by justice, understood 
in this case as the primary virtue of institutions (Rawls 1999: 3). Rawls 
understands justice as a system of equal freedoms. Given the fact that those 
equal freedoms are always realized in unequal ways, Rawls insists on a rule 
that clarifies which differences are acceptable and which are not. According 
to his difference, principle inequalities have to be seen from the perspective 
of a prerogative for the worst-off (Rawls 1999: 52–78).
What can a society do to improve the situation of the worst-off and to put 
in practice, in this sense, a ‘preferential option for the poor?’ Classical 
concepts answer that in such circumstances where commutative justice is 
not sufficient, distributive justice has to be implemented. The consequence 
is that social transfers from the rich to the poor have to be put into practice. 
Such distributive actions are necessary to alleviate poverty, but they are 
not sufficient to overcome it. They often end up in a kind of revolving door 
effect according to which those who pass through this door tend to do it 
repetitively. Therefore another kind of justice has to come into consideration 
for which the Catholic Bishops in the USA coined the term “contributively 
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justice”, i.e. a justice that enables people to contribute to the active life in 
society and therefore to use their gifts and talents, their opportunities and 
social conditions in order to live an active and productive life (United 
States Catholic Bishops 1986: 17; cf. Bedford-Strohm 1993: 88–106).
The elements of such a contributively or, as I would prefer to say, 
participatory justice are manifold (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland 
2006: 43–45). Among them, one element is of central importance, namely 
one the more recent discussion has termed ‘enabling justice’ (Dabrock 2012: 
138–218). It makes use of the new insights of the ‘capabilities approach’ in 
the theory of justice as it was developed primarily by Martha Nussbaum 
and Amartya Sen (Nussbaum 2006; Sen 2009). It refers to all measures 
that promote the capabilities of persons to shape their own lives – through 
their health conditions or their self-confidence, their ability to play or their 
formation/education, through their belonging to communities or their 
ability to control their environment (Nussbaum 2006: 70–78). Education 
and formation play a central role in enabling justice.
A further element of contributively justice is evident in the social 
accessibility of meaningful work. The conditions for that accessibility 
change with every step in recent transformations of work, mostly by new 
technological means. The digitalisation of labour is a good example for 
that. There are advocates of a ‘disruptive’ digitalization of production 
irrespective of its effect on labour conditions or growing unemployment. 
Some of them propose an unconditional basic income that may free the 
state as well as economic enterprises from the responsibility to create 
new jobs for those who lose their previous ones. Advocates of an ‘organic’ 
digitalization ask for a kind of transformation that includes possibilities 
to stay employed for the people involved. The question is what drives this 
transition? From the perspective of participatory justice, there is a clear 
preference for an ‘organic’ transition where the decisive effort is to enable 
vulnerable people and not to lose them.
To achieve that goal it is necessary that the economy should be in the service 
of humans and not humans in the service of the economy. Amartya Sen, 
the Indian Winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, spoke 
on Economy in the service of humans as a precondition for a development 
on a global scale that will promote freedom (Sen 1999). The coincidence 
between the insights of an Indian economist and an impulse leading back 
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to Christian values as reflected in the Reformation tradition, in my view, 
turns out to be impressive.
To summarize: The critique of an exploitative use of misfortunes and 
poverty, as formulated by the Reformers, is based on the conviction that 
all humans are equal in dignity and should therefore have access to the 
opportunity to contribute productively to the common life of society 
and to the best of its members. Therefore, following through such a line 
of thought, contributively justice is a central criterion for the regulation 
of the economy. Practical knowledge is needed to institutionalize this 
contributively justice by means of education, formation, training and the 
organization of just participation in society.
This kind of evaluation needs a practice of reflexive equilibrium 
between the principles of a Christian (or other) ethics and the rules of 
economy. That would exactly fulfill what Shmuel Eisenstadt once called 
‘Wirtschaftsethik’, which evaluates this specific institutional sphere on 
the premises of a specific religious or other ethical orientation (Eisenstadt, 
quoted by Seligman 1998: XXII). This kind of equilibrium could be a form 
of economic ethics suitable to our times.
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